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Abstract
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many Governments are instituting mobile tracking
technologies to perform rapid contact tracing. However, these technologies are only effec-
tive if the public is willing to use them, implying that their perceived public health benefits
must outweigh personal concerns over privacy and security. The Australian federal govern-
ment recently launched the ‘COVIDSafe’ app, designed to anonymously register nearby
contacts. If a contact later identifies as infected with COVID-19, health department officials
can rapidly followup with their registered contacts to stop the virus’ spread. The current
study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network
tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google’s Bluetooth exposure notification sys-
tem) in two representative samples of the Australian public prior to the launch of COVID-
Safe. We compared these attitudes to usage of the COVIDSafe app after its launch in a
further two representative samples of the Australian public. Using Bayesian methods, we
find widespread acceptance for all tracking technologies, however, observe a large inten-
tion-behaviour gap between people’s stated attitudes and actual uptake of the COVIDSafe
app. We consider the policy implications of these results for Australia and the world at large.
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
disease has changed how Australians live, work and socialise. In the absence of a vaccine or
treatment, behavioral measures such as restricting public gatherings and physical distancing
[1], mask wearing [2], lockdown policies, and hand-washing [3] have been the only means
available to slow the spread of the virus (Fig 1). The easing of restrictions and reduction of
compliance preempted a ‘second wave’ of infections, shown in Fig 1 [4]. The highly
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transmittable [5] and often asymptomatic nature of this virus [6] suggests a benefit for techno-
logical solutions to curb its spread [7]. Smartphone tracking technologies offer one such
solution.
Smartphone tracking technologies
Smartphones tracking technologies use GPS, telecommunication, or Bluetooth data to create a
list of contacts with whom a user may have been co-located [7]. This contact information is
either stored locally on the phone (decentralized) or on a centralised server. Partially central-
ized systems also exist that allow users to decide when data is uploaded to a central sever. If a
registered contact later tests positive with COVID-19, the user can be instantly notified, allow-
ing them to self-isolate and get tested, thus helping to slow the virus’ spread [8]. A description
of these technologies and storage options are provided in Fig 2.
People engage in a “privacy calculus” when balancing the benefits (public health) and con-
sequences (surveillance creep) of disclosing sensitive data [13]. For mobile tracking technolo-
gies to be effective, their benefits must outweigh concerns over privacy, security, and risk of
harm [14]. In a recent survey of 100 Australians, Kininmonth et al., (2018) [15] found Govern-
ment surveillance was acceptable when conducted by a “trusted” source for “necessary” rea-
sons, meaning perceptions about the risk from COVID-19 and perception about those
collecting the data (e.g., Governments or corporations), will impact public acceptance for
COVID-19 tracking technologies.
Newly published findings by Wnuk et al. (2020) on COVID-19 tracking acceptance among
Polish adults exemplifies how the perceived threat of COVID-19 influences public acceptance
of tracking technologies. Regression analysis revealed perceived COVID-19 threat, lack of con-
trol over one’s life due to COVID-19, and ideological beliefs were all predictive of COVID-19
Fig 1. Australian COVID-19 cases, deaths, and key-dates. COVID-19 daily cases (blue), deaths (red), and key policy decisions (text) in Australia during the COVID-
19 pandemic within the period January 23rd–July 14th, 2020. Collection dates of the current study are highlighted in green and the introduction of key tracking
technologies are highlighted in yellow. A record of news sources for this fig are included on our OSF page, osf.io/sw7rq.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g001
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tracking acceptance. Similar findings have also been observed in the United Kingdom [16] and
among young adults in Taiwan [17]. Understanding the complex interplay between percep-
tions of the virus’ threat, and the personal risks and public health benefits that accompany
COVID-19 tracking technologies, is crucial for policy decision makers who wish to introduce
effective technological solutions for curtailing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (for further
social and behaviour solutions, see [1]).
The current research aims to extend our theoretical understanding about the privacy cal-
culus and the shifting of public attitudes during important real-world situations. Our investi-
gation will focus on a limited set of three real-world COVID-19 tracking technologies that
can be rapidly implemented by governments or corporations, and that use a readily available
and widely distributed piece of hardware: mobile smartphones. To these ends, we focus on
the following COVID-19 tracking technologies: telecommunication network tracking (e.g.,
Taiwan’s electronic fence [18]), a Government smartphone app (e.g., Australia’s COVIDSafe
[19]), and Apple and Google’s exposure notification (EN) Bluetooth system (e.g., Germany’s
Corona Warn-App [20]). Practically, this research aims to inform policy makers of the nec-
essary conditions for public acceptance of mobile tracking technologies during the COVID-
19 pandemic. Although our investigation focuses exclusively on Australia, our results may
prove informative for other countries considering the introduction of mobile contract trac-
ing technologies.
Mobile tracking in Australia
Telecommunication tracking has already been used by the Australian Government to create
anonymized social mobility reports but not to individuate users or locate them relative to
each other [21]. Theoretically, the Government could access this data to locate users without
their consent under the auspices of national security [22], however, such access is highly
Fig 2. Mobile tracking technologies. Infographic highlighting the differences between telecommunication [9], GPS [10], and Bluetooth tracking [11, 12], and the
distinction between centralized and decentralized data storage [8].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g002
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restricted and data breaches are a criminal offense. This preexisting tracking infrastructure is
further hindered by the precision of the technology, becoming less accurate where network
towers are sparsely populated [9]. Practically, this means many individuals could be falsely
identified as ‘relatively close’ to an infected individual due to poor tracking precision [23],
ultimately harming acceptance and trust in the technology. In an attempt to decrease the
chance for false-alarms, the Australian Government has instead pursued a partially-central-
ized Bluetooth government app.
On April 26th, 2020, the Australian Government introduced its COVID-19 mobile tracking
app called COVIDSafe [19]. The app uses Bluetooth technology to create an anonymous regis-
ter of nearby app-users stored locally on their phone [24]. If an app-user voluntarily identifies
as infected, their COVIDSafe contacts are called by members of the health department and are
encouraged to get tested and stay home. The registry is then sent to manual contact tracers
working in the health department to contact potentially infected individuals who were not
using the app.
The COVIDSafe app implements several measures to ensure data privacy and security.
Contact registry identifications are randomised every two-hours, registry contacts are deleted
after 21 days [25], and the app’s client-side code (i.e., not the server code where privacy mea-
sures are implemented) is freely available [26]. Furthermore, the newly legislated Privacy
Amendment Act 2020 mandates that COVIDSafe data must be destroyed once the app is no
longer effective, and that individuals cannot be forced to download the app or be discriminated
against for not doing so [27].
As of July 7th, the app was downloaded 6.5 million times (approximately half the number
targeted by the Government) [28]. By late August, the app had only traced six individuals not
already identified by manual tracing efforts [29] prompting some to question whether the lack
of effectiveness is related to insufficient uptake. If so, it is important to understand what factors
underlie Australians’ willingness to download and use the COVIDSafe app, and if other
options would be more effective.
The current study
Prior to the release of the COVIDSafe app, we asked two representative samples of the Austra-
lian public about their attitudes to three hypothetical smartphone tracking scenarios—a Gov-
ernment app, telecommunication tracking, and the Apple and Google exposure notification
‘EN’ Bluetooth system. The EN system launched on May 20th 2020 [30], is functionally identi-
cal to COVIDSafe except that data is stored in a decentralized system and contact registries
can be shared between any two apps that use the EN system [31]. We then compared attitudes
to these hypothetical scenarios to a further two representative samples that reported on their
usage of the newly released COVIDSafe app. This allowed us to assess the changing attitudes
towards tracking technologies conditioned by both the state of the pandemic, and the changing
literacy about tracking technologies in the population, and to determine how public attitudes
inform the uptake of COVID-19 tracking technologies. As the reader will soon see, the track-
ing scenarios presented to participants varied on several dimensions (e.g., voluntary vs manda-
tory tracking, centralized vs decentralized storage, government vs corporate data ownership).
We did this to assess public attitudes to real-world tracking policies that were under consider-
ation in Australia, so as to better inform policy decision makers in their response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. We did not have specific hypotheses regarding public acceptance of
these scenarios, or public uptake of the COVIDSafe app. Instead, we directly assessed public
attitudes and reported a descriptive account of our findings.
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Materials and methods
Overview
We present four survey samples collected during the COVID-19 pandemic in Australia
between April 6th and June 23rd 2020 (see Fig 1). The surveys examined attitudes towards
smartphone tracking technologies, in addition to a range of constructs such as world views,
trust in government, and the impact and perception of COVID-19.
Sample 1 examined two hypothetical tracking scenarios: One a voluntary government app
that notified users if they were in contact with an infected individual and shared contact regis-
tries with the health department (“Gov App” scenario), and one in which all mobile users were
tracked through the telecommunication network through which the government could issue
quarantine orders (“Telecommunication” scenario). The Gov App scenario was intended to
gauge attitudes towards the soon-to-be released COVIDSafe app; however, it was necessarily
vague on how the app would work as these details had not been announced at the time.
Sample 2 included an additional “Bluetooth” scenario, describing the EN system proposed
by Apple and Google. Phones exchanged contact information and notified users if a nearby
individual later identifies as infected; the government was never informed of these individuals.
Samples 3 and 4 focused exclusively on a real-world tracking scenario, the COVIDSafe app.
COVIDSafe was described as functionally identical to the “Bluetooth” scenario, except that
contact information was accessible by the health department to enhance manual contact trac-
ing efforts and all data was collected and secured by the Government.
Ethics statement
This study received ethics approval from the University of Melbourne’s psychology health and
applied sciences human ethics sub-committee, approval number 1955555. Participants gave
informed consent and were debriefed at the end of each survey. Information and debriefing
sheets are included in each Qualtrics survey, versions of which can be found at osf.io/sw7rq.
Participants
Participants were a representative sample of the Australian public stratified by gender, age,
and state per the 2016 census [32] and obtained through the data sampling platform Dynata.
Collection dates, sample size, and cumulative COVID-19 cases and deaths are summarized in
Table 1. Participants were aged 18 years or older and completed a 10-minute (Sample 1) or
15-minute (Samples 2–4) online survey for which they were reimbursed in the form of gift
cards, points programs, or charitable contributions as per their agreement with Dynata.
Design and procedure
Surveys can be downloaded in full at osf.io/sw7rq. Fig 3 illustrates the survey design at each
stage of data collection. Plain language statements, consent, comprehension checks directly
following each scenario, and free-text responses at the end of the survey are not shown.
Table 1. Sample information. Collection dates, sample size, and cumulative COVID-19 cases and deaths in Australia at the time of data collection.
Date N Cumulative Cases Cumulative Deaths
Sample 1 April 6th 2020 1275 5744 36
Sample 2 April 15th 2020 1777 6416 61
Sample 3 May 7th 2020 597 6738 88
Sample 4 June 23rd 2020 596 7474 102
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.t001
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Immunity passports (Samples 2 and 3), worldview items, and beliefs in science (Sample 4) will
not be discussed in the current paper.
After providing consent and demographic information, participants were asked about how
they perceived the risk of COVID-19 (Risk items summarized in Table 2). Responses were
Fig 3. Survey design for Samples 1–4. White boxes depict a block of questions with the number of items displayed on the right. Black boxes display the scenario to
which participants were randomly assigned (between-subjects design) and gray boxes illustrate judgments of tracking acceptability. ‘Acceptability with other�’
included a local phone data-storage option for the government app scenario and the ability to opt-out of tracking in the telecommunication scenario. Items not
included in the results of this paper are shaded gray.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g003
Table 2. Perceived risk. Items assessing the perceived risk from COVID-19.
Item Question Label
Risk 1 How severe do you think novel coronavirus (COVID-19) will be for the general population? General harm
Risk 2 How harmful would it be for your health if you were to become infected COVID-19? Personal harm
Risk 3 How concerned are you that you might become infected with COVID-19? Concern self
Risk 4 How concerned are you that somebody you know might become infected with COVID-19? Concern others
Impact 1 Have you ever tested positive to COVID-19? Positive self
Impact 2 Has somebody you know ever tested positive to COVID-19? Positive other
Impact 3 How many days, if any, have you been in quarantine or self-isolation? Lockdown days
Impact 4 Have you temporarily or permanently lost your job as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic? Job loss
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.t002
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made on a 5-point scale, where increasing values were associated with greater endorsement of
the issue, (e.g., 1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely). Participants were then asked about the impact
from COVID-19 (see impact items, Table 2) and were asked to estimate national fatalities and
policy compliance (Samples 2–4), before being randomly assigned to read a single tracking
scenario description. In Samples 3 and 4, participants were additionally asked what technol-
ogy, (e.g., Bluetooth, GPS, telecommunication network), COVIDSafe used prior to reading the
scenario description. Following each description, participants responded to a comprehension
question; participants who did not identify the scenario from among three foils were excluded
at analysis.
The government app scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing the virus’
spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system, the economy, and save
many lives. The Australian Government might consider using smartphone tracking data to
identify and contact those who may have been exposed to people with COVID-19. This
would help reduce community spread by identifying those most at risk and allowing health
services to be appropriately targeted. Only people that downloaded a government app
and agreed to be tracked and contacted would be included in the project. The more peo-
ple that download and use this app the more effectively the Government would be able to
contain the spread of COVID-19. Data would be stored in an encrypted format on a secure
server accessible only to the Australian Government. Data would only be used to contact
those who might have been exposed to COVID-19.” Bold text is displayed as it was in the
survey and the Chinese translation used during the survey is provided in the supporting
information.
The telecommunication tracking scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing the virus’
spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system, the economy, and save
many lives. The Australian Government might consider using phone tracking data supplied
by telecommunication companies to identify and contact those who may have been
exposed to people with COVID-19. This would help reduce community spread by identify-
ing those most at risk and allowing health services to be appropriately targeted. All people
using a mobile phone would be included in the project, with no possibility to opt-out.
Data would be stored in an encrypted format on a secure server accessible only to the Aus-
tralian Government who may use the data to locate people who were violating lockdown
orders and enforce them with fines and arrests where necessary. Data would also be used
to inform the appropriate public health response and to contact those who might have been
exposed to COVID-19, and individual quarantine orders could be made on the basis of this
data.”
The Bluetooth (Apple and Google exposure notification system) scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing the virus’
spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system, the economy, and save
many lives. Apple and Google have proposed adding a contact tracing capability to
existing smartphones to help inform people if they have been exposed to others with
COVID-19. This would help reduce community spread of COVID-19 by allowing people
to voluntarily self-isolate. When two people are near each other, their phones would
PLOS ONE COVID-19 smartphone tracking in Australia
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connect via Bluetooth. If a person is later identified as being infected, the people they have
been in close proximity to are then notified without the government knowing who they
are. The use of this contact tracing capability would be completely voluntary. People
who are notified would not be informed who had tested positive.”
And the COVIDSafe app scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing the virus’
spread is essential to minimise the impact on the healthcare system, the economy, and save
many lives. The Australian Government has recently released the COVIDSafe smartphone
app to help identify and contact those who may have been exposed to people with COVID-
19. The use of this app is completely voluntary, but the government has explicitly stated
that easing social distancing restrictions depends at least in part on the degree of com-
munity uptake of this voluntary app. This is because the more people that download and
use this app the more effectively it will help to contain the spread of COVID-19. The app
works with Bluetooth and no location data is collected: when two people are near each
other, their phones connect and keep a record of all these connections. If a person is later
identified as being infected, that person may voluntarily upload their Bluetooth contacts
to a secure server accessible only to the Health Department of the Australian Govern-
ment. This data would only be used by the Health Department of the Australian Gov-
ernment to contact those who might have been exposed to COVID-19.”
Tracking acceptability was assessed directly after the scenario description (1st acceptability)
and after responding to items on the benefits and harm posed by the scenario (2nd acceptabil-
ity). In the government app scenario, participants were asked if they “would download and
use” the app, in the telecommunication scenario if “the use of tracking data in this scenario is
acceptable”, and in the Bluetooth scenario if they “would use” the technology. Items assessing
the benefits and harm posed by each scenario are summarized in Table 3. Responses were
made on a 6-point scale, (e.g., 1 = Not at all, 6 = Extremely). Reverse scored items are denoted
by [R] in the table.
In samples 1 and 2, the second acceptability judgement was followed by two items only if
the described scenario was deemed unacceptable. The first item asked if tracking would be
acceptable under a sunset clause where data was deleted after 6 months. The second item
Table 3. Perceived benefits and harms. Items assessing the benefits and harm arising from smartphone tracking. ‘The Government’ was replaced by ‘Apple and Google’
in the Bluetooth scenario.
Item Question Label
Bfit 1 How confident are you that the described scenario would reduce your likelihood of contracting COVID-19? Reduce contraction
Bfit 2 How confident are you that the described scenario would help you resume your normal activities more rapidly? Resume activity
Bfit 3 How confident are you that the described scenario would reduce the spread of COVID-19? Reduce spread
Harm 1 How difficult is it for people to decline participation? Difficult to decline [R]
Harm 2 To what extent do people have ongoing control of their data? Ongoing control
Harm 3 How sensitive is the data being collected? Data sensitivity
Harm 4 How serious is the risk of harm from the proposed scenario? Risk from tracking
Harm 5 How secure is the data that would be collected? Data security [R]
Harm 6 To what extent is the Government [Apple/Google] only collecting the data necessary to achieve the purposes of the policy? Data necessary
Harm 7 How much do you trust the Government [Apple/Google] to use the tracking data only to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic? Trust intentions
Harm 8 How much do you trust the Government [Apple/Google] to be able to ensure the privacy of each individual? Trust privacy
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.t003
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asked if tracking would be acceptable if participants could opt-out of tracking (telecommuni-
cation scenario), or if data was only stored locally on the phone rather than on a government
server (government app scenario).
In Samples 3 and 4, participants were asked if they “have downloaded the COVIDSafe app”
and could respond “yes”, “no”, or that they “intend to download the app in the future”. Then,
participants were presented follow-up questions probing why they did or did not download
COVIDSafe. These items are summarized in Table 4 and their response options are summa-
rized in square brackets following each question. Following these questions, participants
responded to items probing the benefits and harm posed by the COVIDSafe scenario
(Table 3).
Assessments of acceptability were then followed by items probing attitudes to introducing
immunity passports (Samples 2 and 3), beliefs in the benefits of science (Sample 4), and politi-
cal worldviews. Beliefs in the benefits of science were probed by three items on a 0–10 sliding
scale, (e.g., 0 = Completely agree, 10 = Completely disagree). These items will not be reported
in the current paper.
In Sample 4, participants were asked three final questions. One item measured attitudes to
downloading another country’s COVID-19 tracking app and a second item measured attitudes
on requiring travellers to Australia to download COVIDSafe. A final item asked how partici-
pants viewed the Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Items were responded
to using a seven-point scale, (e.g., 1 = strongly approve, 7 = strongly disapprove).
Data analysis
Bayesian ordinal probit regressions were used to compare Likert-style responses using the
MCMCoprobit and HPDinterval functions in R packages MCMCpack [33] and Coda [34],
respectively. This method assumes that there are latent normally distributed continuous vari-
ables that underlie ordinal responses. These latent variables are then segmented into ordinal
Likert responses by C − 1 (number of response options—1) thresholds. To set the location of
the underlying latent variable and make the model identifiable, the lowest threshold parameter
is fixed at zero [35] and all other thresholds are estimated. Similar items and different scenario
conditions were modelled together to ensure consistent threshold parameters across Likert
Table 4. COVIDSafe questions. COVIDSafe follow-up questions conditioned on if the app was downloaded. Response options shown in brackets.
Downloaded Follow up questions Label
Yes When did you download the app? [The day/week/anytime-after the app was released] When download
Yes Do you have the COVIDSafe app downloaded, registered and have Bluetooth switched on? [Yes/No] Effective use
Yes� Do you leave your phone screen unlocked, Bluetooth on, and COVIDSafe open on the front screen? [Yes/No] Effective use iOS
Yes If you test positive to COVID-19, will you upload your data for manual contact tracing? [Yes/No] Upload data
Yes�� Why did you download COVIDSafe? Download why
Yes�� Who convinced you to download the app? Download who
No�� Why won’t you download the COVIDSafe app? Not download why
No�� Who convinced you to not download the COVIDSafe app? Not download who
Intend to If you test positive to COVID-19, will you upload your data for manual contact tracing? [Yes/No] Upload data
Intend to Why haven’t you downloaded the COVIDSafe app yet? Waiting to download
All Approximately what percentage of the people you know have downloaded the COVIDSafe app? [0–100] Friends downloaded
All If an insufficient number of people download the app, should the Government make it mandatory by issuing fines? [Yes/No] Mandatory download
�Only presented to Apple iOS users; prior to the June 19th update of COVIDSafe the app only worked on Apple iOS devices under the described conditions.
��Denotes items with rank-ordered responses.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.t004
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items and across scenarios (see [36] for model details). For binomial distributions (i.e. propor-
tions of ‘yes’, from a yes or no response variable), Bayesian credible intervals were calculated
using the bayes.prop.test function from the BayesianFirstAid package [37].
These Bayesian methods sample a posterior distribution of plausible means (the probability
that, given our data, the true population mean is ‘x’), by weighing the likelihood of a given
observation against its prior probability of occurring in the sample. Under parametric assump-
tions, these posterior distributions act to constrain the effect of outliers in the tails of the sam-
pled data, and allow the highest region of data density—credible regions of the data
distribution—to inform policy decisions. Practically, this means instead of testing a threshold
of significance (like p-values or Bayes factors), we may instead directly compare the 95% credi-
ble regions of the data distributions to determine if they overlap or not.
The MCMCoprobit function was run with one chain of 20,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) iterations (including 1000 burn-ins) per variable, and a tuning parameter of 0.3 (cor-
responding to the size of the Metropolis-Hastings step). Default priors were used for all param-
eters (i.e., the distributional means and the cutpoints), corresponding to an improper uniform
prior (i.e., over real numbers between the range of -inf and inf) for both the latent variable
means and the threshold parameters. The bayes.prop.test function was run with one chain
with 20,000 MCMC iterations (including 1000 burn-ins). Default priors were again used: a
beta distribution with parameters of α = 1 and β = 1, corresponding to a uniform prior over
the unit interval. Ninety-five percent highest posterior density intervals (HDIs) were estimated
on the resulting posterior samples. Anonymized data and analysis code for this project is avail-
able at osf.io/sw7rq. Unless specified otherwise, results for the same scenarios will be collapsed
across Samples 1 and 2, and results regarding COVIDSafe will be collapsed across Samples 3
and 4.
Results
Data preparation and demographics
Participants who did not reside in Australia, were under the age of 18, failed to pass the com-
prehension check, or did not complete the survey were removed from each sample. Removals,
final sample sizes and demographic information is provided in Table 5. Samples were repre-
sentative per the 2016 census, except for education, which was biased towards University
Graduates. Across Samples 2–4, 93% of participants owned a smartphone (this question was
not included in Sample 1).
Perceived risk from COVID-19
Fig 4 displays the mean ordinal regression posterior distributions and associated likert-style
responses for items querying people’s perceived risk from COVID-19 in each Sample of data
collection. Risk items are described in Table 2. Error bars display the 95% HDI and black hori-
zontal lines illustrate differences where HDIs do not overlap. Posterior means decreased over
time from very-to-somewhat for perceived general harm, concern for self, and personal harm
items. Over time, participants consistently reported being ‘very’ concern for others.
Perceived benefits from tracking
Fig 5 displays the mean ordinal regression posterior distributions and associated likert-style
responses for items querying people’s perceived benefits from tracking in each scenario. Bene-
fit items are described in Table 3. Telecommunication was perceived as most beneficial with
perceptions indicating a moderate reduction in contraction and spread of the virus, and
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moderate ability to aid a return to normal activities. Bluetooth and government app scenarios
were ‘a bit’ effective and did not vary across benefit items. COVIDSafe was perceived to be the
least beneficial technology.
Perceptions of tracking technologies
Fig 6 displays the mean ordinal regression posterior distributions and associated likert-style
responses for items querying people’s perceptions of the tracking technologies. Voluntary
technologies were perceived as similarly easy to decline. Apple and Google’s Bluetooth tech-
nology was perceived to collect the most non-essential data, and to have less-trustworthy
intentions, and poorer data privacy and security than the Government alternatives. COVID-
Safe was perceived as collecting the least sensitive data, as being the least risky technology, and
as having the most ongoing control. Usability (not in Fig 6) for the app technologies—COVID-
Safe, Bluetooth, and government app—was consistently reported as ‘moderate’.
Acceptability of tracking technologies
Fig 7 shows acceptability ratings and COVIDSafe downloads under varying conditions. Base-
line acceptability ratings were measured after responding to the tracking effectiveness items
(2nd acceptability, Fig 3). The remaining items show the subsequent increase in acceptability
under a sunset clause and with an opt-out or local storage option. Intentions to download
under appropriate legislation, and intentions to download in the future (regardless of legisla-
tion) are similarly displayed for COVIDSafe. Acceptability was high (62–70%) and did not dif-
fer meaningfully across the scenarios, and increased with additional privacy options in the
telecommunication and government app scenarios (up to 87% and 70%, respectively). COV-
IDSafe downloads (44%) and intentions to download (58%) were lower than predicted by
acceptability for the Government app, indicating an intention-behavior gap.
Fig 8 shows acceptability ratings for the three tracking scenarios over time and future inten-
tions to download the COVIDSafe app (so as to be comparable to ‘intentions’ measured in
Samples 1 and 2). Posterior HDIs indicate similar intentions to use the hypothetical
Table 5. Demographics. Sample size and demographics for data collection Samples 1–4.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4
Initial Sample 1275 1777 597 596
Removals Not in Australia 60 103 31 36
Under 18 years 8 8 2 1
Comprehension check 252 361 69 85
Incomplete 134 136 46 45
Final Sample 821 1169 449 429
Gender (%) Men 52% 50% 49% 50%
Women 48% 49% 51% 49%
Other 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Not provided 0% 0.3% 0% 0.2%
Age (years) Mean 49 48 47 47
Std. Dev 17 17 17 17
Max. Education (%) Less-than High School 9% 9% 11% 8%
Graduated High School 38% 37% 40% 34%
Graduate University 52% 54% 49% 57%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.t005
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government app and to download the COVIDSafe app over time, and a decline in acceptability
for telecommunication tracking between Samples 1 and 2.
COVIDSafe: Usage and perceptions
The following results were obtained in Samples 3 and 4, and focus exclusively on attitudes
towards and real-world usage of the COVIDSafe app, (e.g., if, when, and why people down-
loaded the app). These results provide a snapshot of how attitudes and intentions (collected in
Samples 1 and 2) differ to real-world behaviours (Samples 3 and 4), informing the previously
measured intention-behavior gap.
Usage and effectiveness. By Sample 4, most COVIDSafe users downloaded the app within
the first day (29%) or week (57%) after its launch. The app’s effective usage rate (i.e., percent-
age of people who correctly use the app) was high across Samples 3 and 4; 87% of users had the
app installed, were registered and kept Bluetooth on when in public. Independently, app regis-
tration and installation was recorded as 94%, and Bluetooth usage was recorded at 71% ‘at all
times’ and at 89% ‘when in public’. Ninety-eight percent users responded that they would
Fig 4. Ordinal regression mean posterior distributions for items assessing the perceived risk from COVID-19 for each sample. Black points display
mean point estimates and coloured error bars display the 95% highest posterior density interval thereof. Dotted lines indicate the ordinal regression
threshold parameters which separate the continuous latent variables into the ordinal response categories made by participants (‘None’ to ‘Extremely’).
Non-overlapping intervals (within items) are denoted by horizontal bars above each comparison.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g004
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upload their registry data if they tested positive for COVID-19, assisting manual contact
tracers.
App users reported their phone’s operating system as primarily Android (53%) or Apple
iOS (46%). Prior to June 19th 2020, COVIDSafe had a known issue on Apple iOS devices
requiring users to leave their phone screen unlocked, Bluetooth on, and COVIDSafe open on
the front screen to function effectively. Forty-five percent of iOS users indicated they used
COVIDSafe in this fashion. Inferring from this proportion, we estimate COVIDSafe effective
usage across all smartphone operating systems prior to June 19th as approximately 61%.
App sharing and future usage. Fifty-six percent of users had tried to share COVIDSafe
with friends and family. The app has an inbuilt sharing feature that can invite others to down-
load the app. By Sample 4, 32% of app users knew of this functionality, 19% had used this fea-
ture, and 61% intended to do so in the future. Across both app users and non-app users,
participants estimated that 33% (SD = 27%) of the people they know have downloaded the
app. This proportion increased to 45% (SD = 28%) among app users and decreased to 23%
Fig 5. Perceived benefits regression. Ordinal regression mean posterior distributions for items assessing the perceived benefits from tracking for each
scenario. Black points display mean point estimates and coloured error bars display the 95% highest posterior density interval thereof. Dotted lines
indicate the ordinal regression threshold parameters which separate the continuous latent variables into the ordinal response categories made by
participants (‘None’ to ‘Extremely’). Non-overlapping intervals (within items) are denoted by horizontal bars above each comparison.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g005
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(SD = 21%) among non-app users. Across all participants, it was estimated that 47%
(SD = 22%) of the Australian population will download and use the COVIDSafe app.
App requirements for travel. COVID-19 tracking apps, such as COVIDSafe, may
become mandatory when entering a country. In Sample 4 of data collection, we asked partici-
pants about their attitudes towards downloading another country’s app, and to requiring trav-
ellers to download COVIDSafe. When probed, 54% of participants somewhat-to-strongly
agreed with downloading another country’s COVID-19 tracking app if it were a condition of
entry to that country; 29% somewhat-to-strongly disagreed, and 15% neither agreed or dis-
agreed. Sixty-seven percent of participants somewhat-to-strongly agreed that all arrivals to
Australia should be required to download and use COVIDSafe as a condition of entry; 14%
somewhat-to-strongly disagreed, and 14% neither agreed or disagreed. This shows an imbal-
ance in which 13% more participants would agree to impose COVIDSafe on people arriving in
Australia, but would not be willing to use a similar tracking app if they were to travel to
another country.
Fig 6. Privacy perceptions regression. Ordinal regression mean posterior distributions for items assessing the privacy perceptions of tracking for each scenario. Black
points display mean point estimates and coloured error bars display the 95% highest posterior density interval thereof. Dotted lines indicate the ordinal regression
threshold parameters which separate the continuous latent variables into the ordinal response categories made by participants (‘None’ to ‘Extremely’). Non-
overlapping intervals (within items) are denoted by horizontal bars above each comparison.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g006
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Perceptions of the COVIDSafe technology. Fig 9 displays public perceptions of what
technology COVIDSafe uses, among those who have and have not downloaded the app. Error
bars display 95% HDIs. A larger proportion of app users identified COVIDSafe as using Blue-
tooth technology (70%) when compared to non-app users (39%). A small proportion of app
users thought COVIDSafe used location, telecommunication or an unknown technology. An
equivalent percentage of non-app users perceived COVIDSafe to use location or an unknown
tracking technology (28–29%).
Reasons for (not) downloading COVIDSafe. COVIDSafe users were asked to arrange a
series of options from most- to least-important describing i) why they downloaded the COV-
IDSafe app, and ii) who convinced them to download the app. A breakdown of these results
are provided in the supporting information (see S1 and S2a Figs). COVIDSafe was primarily
downloaded for reasons of government policy (29%) and concern over other’s health (25%).
Overall, self-health and a return to normal activities were responded to most frequently within
the first three rank-positions. The economy was the least-important reason for downloading
the app (ranked last by 46% of users). Politicians, government advertising and the Prime Min-
ister primarily convinced users to download the app, however, other public figures, scientists
and ‘I did not need convincing’ were most frequently ranked within the top-three options.
Fig 7. Perceived acceptability and uptake. Acceptability of each tracking scenario collapsed across samples under various conditions. Error bars are 95%
Bayesian credible intervals and non-overlapping intervals (within tracking scenario) are denoted by horizontal bars above each comparison.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g007
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We asked non app users to similarly arrange options for who convinced them not to down-
load COVIDSafe. Non-users primarily reported that they ‘did not need convincing’ (25%) or
were convinced by other public figures (17%) and sciences (16%; see supporting information
S2b Fig). The Prime Minister was ranked as the last option by 82% of respondents.
Participants who intend to download COVIDSafe in the future were asked to arrange rea-
sons for why they are yet to download the app (supporting information, S3a and S3b Fig). Par-
ticipants were primarily weighing the pros and cons, 22% and 28% in Sample 3 and 4
respectively. When the app was newly released (Sample 3), time, technological issues, and not
leaving the house were among the top three responses; however, these were surpassed by ‘wait-
ing on others’ and ‘not considered it yet’ by Sample 4. Participants who never intend to down-
load COVIDSafe arranged options to describe their reasoning (supporting information, S3c
and S3d Fig). In Samples 3 and 4 respectively, the primary reasons were privacy (20–30%), bat-
tery usage (16–19%), Government trust (14–18%), and a belief that the app will not be effective
(14–19%). In Sample 4 only, participants also reported concerns about normalizing Govern-
ment tracking (16%).
Fig 8. Perceived acceptability and uptake by date. Tracking acceptability and COVIDSafe downloads plotted by the date of data collection. COVIDSafe results
are displayed for current app downloads (dashed line) and future app downloads (whole-bar). Error bars are 95% Bayesian credible intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g008
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Discussion
In April 2020, we asked two representative samples of the Australian public to rate the per-
ceived risks posed by COVID-19, before rating the acceptability, effectiveness, benefits and
risks posed by three hypothetical COVID-19 tracking scenarios: telecommunication network
tracking, a decentralized Bluetooth Exposure Notification (EN) system backed by Apple and
Google, and a partially centralized government app. Results were compared to two Australian
representative samples collected in May and June on their usage and attitudes towards a real-
world centralized government app, COVIDSafe.
Perceived risks from COVID-19 decreased over the collection dates with the decline of
newly reported cases. Acceptability for the hypothetical tracking scenarios was moderate-to-
high (62–70%) and did not vary across the scenarios; however, these attitudes did not translate
to behaviour. Downloads and intentions to use COVIDSafe were lower than acceptance for
the (very similar) hypothetical government app, highlighting an intention-behavior gap.
Acceptability of the hypothetical tracking scenarios and COVIDSafe uptake did not vary across
Fig 9. Perceived COVIDSafe technology. Public perceptions of the tracking technology used by the COVIDSafe app, grouped by whether participants reported
having downloaded it. Error bars are 95% Bayesian credible intervals. Participants who had downloaded the app were much more likely to report the correct
technology used by the app: Bluetooth tracking.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244827.g009
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the collection dates, except for telecommunication tracking, in which acceptability decreased
between the first and second samples. Overall, COVIDSafe usage was motivated by govern-
ment policy and a desire to safeguard public and personal health, and to return to normal
activities sooner. Those who did not download the app were motivated by concerns over pri-
vacy, a lack of government trust, battery usage, and a fear of normalizing government tracking.
The following discussion highlights our key findings and aims to inform policy makers.
Hypothetical tracking scenarios
No one scenario was perceived to be more risky than another and mandatory telecommunica-
tion tracking was generally perceived to be the most beneficial technology. Data privacy, secu-
rity, and trustworthiness were perceived as lower for Apple and Google’s EN system than for
the comparable government app, and telecommunication tracking was perceived as more dif-
ficult to decline and as having less ongoing control over the data than the other hypothetical
scenarios. These differences reflect the different dimensions on which each scenario varied
(e.g., voluntary vs mandatory uptake, centralized vs decentralized storage). However, regard-
less of how the hypothetical scenarios varied in their risk-benefit profiles, baseline acceptance
remained consistently high. This indicates that these factors trade-off as a consequence of each
individual’s internal privacy calculus. Identifying the degree to which each of these factors con-
tribute to this privacy calculus (à la [38]) is beyond the scope of the current study, however,
represents an important line of future research.
The results of the current study have clear implications for potential corporate and govern-
ment policy decisions. Historically, Australians have disproportionately trusted government
agencies (84%) over private companies like Google and Apple (42%) [39], and only accepted
surveillance if it was deemed necessary [15]. Contrasting these established norms, our results
imply that Australians are willing to sacrifice privacy to governments and corporations in
order to combat the spread of COVID-19. This being said, acceptance increased in all hypo-
thetical scenarios with the introduction of additional privacy preserving measures (e.g., a Sun-
set clause) implying that privacy remains a key issue among the Australian public.
The intention-behavior gap in government apps
Acceptability for the hypothetical centralized government app did not reflect real-world usage
of the COVIDSafe app. In our samples, government trust was consistently “moderate” and the
perceived risks from tracking were equivalent (data privacy and security) or lower (data risk
and sensitivity) for COVIDSafe than for the hypothetical government app. COVIDSafe was
also perceived as having the most ongoing control with regards to participant’s data. These
benefits would suggest that downloads should be greater for COVIDSafe than indicated by
acceptance for the hypothetical government app.
However, the perceived harm and personal risk posed by COVID-19 and the perceived
benefits from COVID-19 tracking decreased by the time of the COVIDSafe Samples. This
plays an important role in the ‘privacy calculus’ performed by the Australian public. Most app
downloads occurred within the first week of the app’s launch when cases were decreasing (Fig
1), and remained stable thereafter. It appears that while cases are low, otherwise accepting
members of the Australian public may perceive COVID-19 tracking to be unnecessary,
explaining the observed intention-behaviour gap.
Reasons for [not] downloading COVIDSafe
Nearly one-third of participants reported government policy as the primary reason for down-
loading COVIDSafe and 56% reported government officials and advertising as providing the
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most convincing arguments to download the app. By contrast, one-quarter of those who did
not (and will not) download the app did not need convincing to reach this decision. These
individuals were primarily concerned by issues of data security (e.g., preserving privacy, nor-
malizing government tracking, and a belief that the government was not trustworthy) and
functionality (e.g., battery drain and a belief the app would not be effective), and were dispro-
portionately misinformed about the COVIDSafe tracking technology.
Individuals who intend to download the app in the future were still weighing the pros and
cons of doing so, or waiting on others to download the app for it to be effective. With only
44% of our sample downloading COVIDSafe and an effective usage rate between 61–87% (pre
vs. post the June 19th 2020 iOS update), convincing this undecided cohort is critical to
improving uptake. We observed other people’s health, returning to normal activities, and safe-
guarding one’s own health were primary reasons for downloading COVIDSafe. Furthermore,
concern for others’ health did not diminish as COVID-19 cases declined. We surmise that
these are critical factors when encouraging tracking technology uptake in undecided members
of the public.
Limitations
Our study only included three hypothetical tracking scenarios, a relatively small sample of the
potential technological solutions now available [40]. Furthermore, the hypothetical scenarios
presented in our surveys do not perfectly describe real-world policies or technologies that have
been implemented. The hypothetical Bluetooth scenario and the government app scenario
were both created before the Apple and Google EN system and COVIDSafe app were devel-
oped and are not perfect descriptions of these technologies. However, it seems unlikely that
minor inconsistencies in our hypothetical scenarios and the real-world tracking technologies
would drastically alter public perceptions. Our measures were also made when COVID-19
cases were declining, altering how policy makers need to interpret the results (see the following
section on policy implications).
The direct comparison of technology acceptance is also limited by differences among the
scenario descriptions. For example, the telecommunication tracking scenario was accompa-
nied by mandatory fines or arrests, while the other scenarios were not. Although these differ-
ences reflect real-world policy decisions—fines may accompany mandatory tracking but not a
voluntary app—readers must be aware that reported acceptance is more than simply whether
the technology itself was acceptable, but instead, whether it was acceptable within a specific
context. Policy makers should bear this in mind when comparing acceptability ratings between
the scenarios. Finally, our samples may have an inherent bias towards technology acceptance
due to our assessment of technological issues through an online survey.
Policy implications
Public acceptance for tracking technologies when COVID-19 cases were declining (see Fig 1)
did not translate to app uptake when cases were close to zero. Our results show that acceptabil-
ity and app take is dependent upon i) the privacy preserving measures that accompany the
technology, and ii) the perceived severity of the pandemic. Therefore, policy makers may view
our results as a benchmark of Australian attitudes and behaviors when cases are low. Indeed,
our results suggest that uptake of COVIDSafe and acceptance for tracking technologies will
only increase if COVID-19 cases were to again increase in Australia.
Our results suggest that the Australian Government has broad support to introduce privacy
encroaching tracking technologies as long as they are perceived to be effective and necessary.
Our results indicate policymakers can increase acceptance and uptake of tracking technologies
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in two ways. First, policymakers could leverage privacy calculus by improving the messaging
and information dissemination regarding the privacy protections that accompany tracking
technologies. Second, policymakers could focus on factors unrelated to privacy calculus, for
example, ‘nudge’ factors [41], that aim to make the technology more usable, and easier to com-
municate and share with others. We surmise that targeting these factors may be more benefi-
cial to acceptance and uptake than modifying the technical details of the technology.
Finally, our analysis of rank-ordered reasons for (not) downloading COVIDSafe provides a
clear framework to deliver policy decisions. Arguments for tracking technologies appear most
convincing when presented by trusted government individuals and advertisers, and most
effective when the messaging focuses on i) other people’s health, ii) returning life to normal
activities, and iii) safe guarding one’s own health.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the largest health crises of the past century, and in lieu of a
vaccine or treatment, requires new technological solutions to stop its spread and return socie-
ties to normal life. We found acceptability was high among the Australian public for three
hypothetical privacy-encroaching COVID-19 tracking technologies—telecommunication net-
work tracking, the Apple/Google exposure notification system, and a centralized government
app. We also observed that acceptability may not translate to public uptake. COVIDSafe
downloads were far fewer than predicted by the rate at which participants endorsed the hypo-
thetical government app, and appeared to be impacted by privacy concerns and the risk of
infection. Inferring from our results, we provide clear policy implications to assist decision
makers in introducing effective methods of COVID-19 tracking. This study, conducted on a
representative Australian sample, can inform decision makers the world over in their COVID-
19 pandemic responses, particularly in countries with similar cultures and attitudes towards
privacy and public health.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Rank ordered responses for why people downloaded the COVIDSafe app. Partici-
pants were asked to rank order from most-important to least-important the five reasons pre-
sented on the y-axis of S1 Fig. The cumulative responses probabilities for each item are
displayed in blue and the percentage of responses at each ranked-position are displayed by text
in each cell, for example, in the first ranked-position Government policy was viewed as most
important (29%) followed by others health (25%). Returning to normal activities was most fre-
quently ranked in the second position (38%) followed by self health (28%). To show which
items were viewed as most important overall, the cumulative percentage of responses to each
item are shaded in blue, with cumulative percentages increasing from left-to-right (lighter to
darker). For example, return to normal activities, self health, and others health were perceived
as the important reasons overall, accruing the most responses in the first three rank-positions.
Overall, the economy was ranked the least-important reason for down-loading COVIDSafe.
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Rank ordered responses for who convinced participants to download the COVID-
Safe app (a) or who convinced participants to not download the app (b). Each plot displays
data collapsed across Samples 3 and 4; response percentages are displayed in text and the
cumulative responses probabilities for each item are displayed in blue. When asked, most par-
ticipants responded that other politicians, government advertising and the Prime Minister
were the primary individuals who convinced them to download COVID Safe (S2a Fig). Public
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figures, scientists and did not need convincing were frequently ranked in the first three-posi-
tions. The Prime Minister was ranked as least important by 50% of respondents. Most partici-
pants who did not download COVIDSafe indicated they ‘did not need convincing’ or were
convinced by other public figures and scientists (S2b Fig). Friends and family were frequently
ranked in the top-three positions. The Prime Minister was ranked least important by 82% of
respondents.
(TIF)
S3 Fig. Rank ordered responses asking individuals why they are yet to download the COVID-
Safe app in Samples 3 (a) and 4 (b), or why they will never download the app in Samples 3 (c)
and 4 (d). Response percentages are displayed in text and cumulative responses probabilities
for each item are displayed in blue. ‘Weighing the pros and cons’ was the primary reason for
not yet downloading the app. In Sample 3 when the app was newly released, time, technical
issues and not leaving the house were among the top reasons, however, were replaced in Sam-
ple 4 with less time-sensitive issues: ‘waiting on others’ and ‘not considered it’. In both sam-
ples, concerns regarding privacy, battery usage, Government trust, and a belief that the app
will be non effective were primary reasons for never downloading COVIDSafe. In Sample 4,
concern regarding the normalizing of Government tracking became a primary issue.
(TIF)
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